{"id":2024,"date":"2016-04-08T23:25:34","date_gmt":"2016-04-08T23:25:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/covcasbulletin.info\/?p=2024"},"modified":"2016-04-08T23:25:34","modified_gmt":"2016-04-08T23:25:34","slug":"nagorno-karabakh-trying-to-separate-fact-from-fiction","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/covcasbulletin.info\/?p=2024","title":{"rendered":"Nagorno-Karabakh: Trying to Separate Fact from Fiction"},"content":{"rendered":"

By JOSHUA KUCERA*
\neurasianet<\/em><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>When the deadliest fighting in decades broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh in early April, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and the rest of the world struggled to figure out what was going on. Did Azerbaijan, as it claimed, really seize villages and strategic heights? Were there really hundreds of casualties on each side? How did the fighting start?<\/p>\n

In any conflict, the fog of war makes it difficult to sort out truth from propaganda. But the situation in Karabakh is especially murky because so few independent observers are able to monitor the shaky ceasefire that has been in place since 1994.<\/p>\n

A monitoring mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) includes only six observers, including Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, who has headed the mission since 1996. Further, the monitors are not based in the region and must announce their visits to the line of contact separating Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in advance. OSCE monitors have not been able to visit the scene of the most recent fighting because of security reasons, Kasprzyk said.<\/p>\n

\u201cMonitoring visits to any areas affected by clashes on the [line of contact] are not possible at this very moment, though we are trying to organize these \u2026 to take place as soon as the situation allows,\u201d Kasprzyk said at a Tuesday meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council. \u201cThe sides are responsible for creating the necessary security conditions. \u2026 My office, with my mandate and the resources it has, can only play a limited role in conflict prevention and assist when there is a need for it.\u201d<\/p>\n

By contrast, the OSCE monitoring mission in eastern Ukraine, covering a smaller territory than Karabakh, totals close to 700 monitors. A European Union mission monitoring the ceasefire in Georgia around the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia includes about 200 monitors.<\/p>\n

The blame lies not with the OSCE itself but with the parties to the conflict, who have a veto over changes to the monitoring regime, most analysts contend. \u201cRussia has an interest in at least the veneer of acquiescence\u201d with an international monitoring regime, said one military officer with peacekeeping experience in the Caucasus, who asked not to be named, explaining the more robust missions in Georgia and Ukraine. In Karabakh, \u201cneither side wants it.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cFor all intents and purposes, there is no monitoring,\u201d said Sabine Freizer, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council who studies the Caucasus. \u201cWith such little monitoring,\u201d she added, \u201cit\u2019s surprising there haven\u2019t been more violations.\u201d<\/p>\n

Effective monitoring is made even more difficult by the rough terrain, remoteness, and particular topography of the line of contact, with trenches dug in and the two sides separated in some places by only 200 meters. \u201cIt\u2019s not easy to drive down the middle of that,\u201d the military officer said. \u201cThis is really a ceasefire that\u2019s completely unmonitored by anybody.\u201d<\/p>\n

The OSCE monitoring in Karabakh was relatively successful while the conflict remained relatively frozen, with a static line of contact and only sporadic small arms fire. \u201cUntil about three to five years ago, the ceasefire had been self-enforcing,\u201d said Richard Kauzlarich, a former US ambassador to Azerbaijan and currently an adjunct professor at the School of Public Policy, George Mason University. \u201cWhen the exchanges began to graduate to sniper fire, efforts by special forces to cross the line of contact, and the use of heavy weaponry, it was clear that a more robust independent monitoring would be necessary.\u201d<\/p>\n

There have been proposals to bolster the monitoring mission, including a greater number of monitors and setting up electronic sensors that could track ceasefire violations. That approach has been supported<\/a> by the US State Department and Armenia. At a meeting of OSCE member state ambassadors to Yerevan on April 4, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan repeated<\/a> his call for an increased OSCE presence, including \u201cthe introduction of [a] ceasefire violations investigation mechanism, and a more robust monitoring mandate.\u201d<\/p>\n

But Azerbaijan opposes it on the grounds that it would solidify what it deems an occupation of its territory by Armenian forces. \u201cWith some 14 percent of its territory occupied, Baku has no interest in keeping the situation frozen along current dividing lines. In Yerevan and Stepanakert, there is much more support for reinforced monitoring to increase local security,\u201d Freizer said.<\/p>\n

Given the lack of political will for more official monitoring, Freizer suggested that informal civilian monitoring, bolstered by social media, could fill some of the gap. \u201cEspecially in this region, where information tends to be the monopoly of the state, independent monitoring and reporting is extremely rare \u2013 but also essential,\u201d she said.<\/p>\n

*Joshua Kucera is a Washington, DC-based freelance writer who specializes in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East. He is the editor of EurasiaNet’s Bug Pit blog.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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