By LEVON NIKOLYAN
New Eastern Europe
After two decades of silence, in 2012 the new Georgian government provoked some talks about re-opening the railway stretching from Russia, through Abkhazia, Georgia, to Armenia. “Saakashvili was always looking for an opportunity to say no to Abkhazians and South Ossetians,” said Georgian Minister for Reintegration Paata Zakareishvili, in an attempt to mitigate the tension between Abkhazia/Russia and Georgia. “We are looking for reasons to say yes, while always taking into account, of course, the state interests of Georgia.” However, there are outside players that may not want to alter the status quo of the region and over time it becomes clear that the re-opening of the railway will remain unrealistic for years to come.
The Transcaucasus Railway – the first railway in the Caucasus and the only railway linking Georgia and Russia – was built by Tsarist Russia and expanded within the Soviet Union. It was a strategic railway that allowed Russia broader access into the Caucasus region. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the railway was taken over by the respective entities in the region. While the Tbilisi-Baku section of the railway is being rehabilitated, the prospects are uncertain for the Sukhumi-Tbilisi section. This strategic section of the railway ceased operating as a result of the unresolved conflict over Abkhazia since the 1992-1993 bloody war between Georgia and Abkhazia. Combined with the Nagorno Karabakh conflict during the same period, rail links between Russia and Armenia became impractical.
The re-opening of the railway involves both political/geopolitical and economic interests, with multiple players. And as the number of players increases, the possibility for a negotiated agreement becomes more and more vague. For example, on the regional level Azerbaijan and Turkey, two strategically important partners of Georgia, have expressed concerns against the operation of the railway. The idea of Zakareishvili provoked sharp criticism from the Azerbaijani side, and Baku made it clear that they are extremely concerned about Tbilisi’s plans to run a railway through Abkhazia. Some Azerbaijani experts viewed this as an attempt to provide Russia ways to supply its military bases on the territory of Armenia, as well as allow Armenia to overcome its landlocked position. For example, Azerbaijani parliament deputy Musa Gasimli said that if that happens, Baku “could provide support to the separatist regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia”. Obviously, this initiative would allow Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh to improve their position. Russia will be able to re-supply its troops in Armenia not only via air, but also in a cheaper and more efficient way. A rail link between Armenia and Russia would also encourage expansion towards Iran. Armenian Political analyst Sergey Shakaryants is convinced that Russia and Iran would benefit from a reliable railway link through Armenia, which would also allow for speedy transportation of massive military equipment.
On the other end there is the Abkhazia factor. Although in June 2013 former Prime Minister of Abkhazia Sergey Shamba declared that eventually Abkhazia will agree to the re-opening of the railway because of its alliance obligations towards Russia, the Abkhazian side claims that the railway project has not been implemented because of Georgian objections, who consider it a political matter. According to Deputy Foreign Minister of Abkhazia Irakli Khintba “Tbilisi’s position is the following: if this is an economic project, then Tbilisi should negotiate on the opening of the road with Moscow … if they ever decide to use the railway from Russia to Armenia, the political and legal jurisdiction of the Abkhaz section of the railway cannot be subject to speculation. This Abkhaz railway is the property of our state and there cannot be any other opinion.”
On the geopolitical level, the issue also involves serious elements of the hegemonic power struggle between Russia and NATO. It is beyond a doubt that the re-opening of the rail link would strengthen the authority of Russia in the South Caucasus and give it extra motivation in its policy towards the region. It will definitely re-shuffle the balance will signal that Georgia is changing its tough position towards Russia to a milder and friendlier one. While the European Union’s Eastern Partnership initiative is attempting to achieve higher levels of European integration in the region, and while the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway project sets an ideal link between Europe and the South Caucasus, the re-opening of the Sukhumi-Tbilisi railway will harm all these efforts and will tilt Georgia back towards Russian hegemony.
The Kars–Tbilisi–Baku railway project is to directly connect Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. It is planned to be completed by late 2015 and will serve as an alternative route to the Kars–Gyumri–Tbilisi railway. Ilham Aliyev, the president of Azerbaijan, has reportedly declared, “If we succeed with this project, the Armenians will end in complete isolation, which would create an additional problem for their already bleak future”. Even though the EU and the United States did not provide financial backing for the project, seeing it as designed to bypass Armenia, they may have given their tacit consent for a project that will link the South Caucasus with Europe and away from Russia. Provided the current crises in Russia-US relations over Ukraine, Russia may make the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan more costly, while the Kars–Tbilisi–Baku railway offers an alternative solution. To say more, in September 2014 Azerbaijan’s foreign ministry announced that Afghanistan has expressed interest in joining the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway. NATO member Turkey is providing a substantial part of the required funding while the other bulk comes from Azerbaijan’s Oil Fund.
In October 2013, International Alert published an assessment of the potential economic benefits from the re-opening of the Sochi-Sukhumi-Tbilisi-Yerevan railway, separating the economic effects of hypothetically restoring the railway from the political aspects. The research was conducted between December 2012 and September 2013 and concluded that “the hypothetical re-opening of railway transport on the Sochi-Sukhumi-Tbilisi-Yerevan route is economically irrational and freight traffic would not ensure a return on investment because of the high cost of repair works on the Psou-Ingiri (Zugdidi) segment and the relatively small volume of potential cargo.” The total cost of repair works to restore the railway route was estimated at 277.5 million US dollars, of which, $251 million would go towards the restoration of the Psou-Inguri segment (190 km), and $26.5 million for the Inguri-Ingiri segment. The Ingiri-Tbilisi-Gyumri-Yerevan segment is operational and does not require repair.
Investment in the 190 km Psou-Inguri segment of the railway was estimated to give the lowest return, even with maximum possible cargo of 10 million tonnes per year for at least 16 years. However, there is a lack of cargo. The most optimistic scenario does not envisage more than four million tonnes of cargo a year, leaving the profitability threshold of 10 million tonnes unachievable. All these factors taken together make the investment prospect unattractive.
The re-opening of the Sukhumi-Tbilisi rail link is both politically and economically unjustified. Politically, Georgia has to make a choice between higher levels of cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey, better opportunities for further European integration, the benefits stemming from the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway project, as opposed to going back into the Russian orbit. It looks like Georgia has already made its choice, which is by no means tied to Russia. Abkhazia, in its turn, does not have much choice in the context of its partial recognition and its absence from serious negotiations. Economically, as the 2013 assessment by International Alert demonstrated, the costs are higher than the benefits. It is also worthwhile to note that International Alert’s assessment did not account for the potential loss that would result from the cancellation of the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku project, assuming that these two railway projects are mutually exclusive.
Therefore, while freight and passenger trains could bring Abkhazia and Georgia certain financial dividends, while it would diversify Abkhazia’s foreign trade and make it less dependent on Russia, all the positive outcomes, taken together, cannot outweigh the costs. This does not only concern financial costs, but also military and political security and national interests. It is, therefore, unlikely that in the near future the railway will be re-opened.
Levon Nikolyan is University of Oxford alumnus, independent researcher and political analyst on the post-Soviet space.